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ABSTRACT
The advent of on-body/at-home sensors connected to personal
devices leads to the generation of fine grain highly sensitive
personal data at an unprecendent rate. However, despite the
promises of large scale analytics there are obvious privacy con-
cerns that prevent individuals to share their personnal data.
In this paper, we propose Chiaroscuro, a complete solution for
clustering personal data with strong privacy guarantees. The
execution sequence produced by Chiaroscuro is massively dis-
tributed on personal devices, coping with arbitrary connections
and disconnections. Chiaroscuro builds on our novel data struc-
ture, called Diptych, which allows the participating devices to
collaborate privately by combining encryption with differential
privacy. Our solution yields a high clustering quality while
minimizing the impact of the differentially private perturbation.
Chiaroscuro is both correct and secure. Finally, we provide
an experimental validation of our approach on both real and
synthetic sets of time-series.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.8 Database Man-
agement: Data Mining; K.4.1 Computers and Society: Privacy;
H.2.4 Database Management: Distributed Databases;
Keywords: differential privacy; secure multi-party computa-
tion; clustering; k-means; time-series; gossip; sensors.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, individuals are able to monitor various biometric
indicators (through, e.g., heart-rate or blood-flow sensors, ac-
celerometers, connected scales) for health, sports, or well-being
reasons, as well as various consumption indicators (through,
e.g., smart-meters or smart-plugs for electricity or water con-
sumption). This results in the production of big personal data
in the form of sequences of time-stamped real values, called
time-series, stored in the personal devices of the individuals.
Such wealth of personal time-series opens up exciting op-
portunities to learn valuable knowledge. Cluster analysis, also
called clustering, aims at forming groups of data (or clusters)
such that similar data appear in the same group and dissimilar
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data appear in different groups. Clustering is widely used in
various application domains, e.g., medicine, genetics, market-
ing, or social sciences. Clustering could, for example, allow a
household to discover that its electrical price plan is not suited
to its usage, compared to the price plan usually chosen by those
having similar electrical consumption habits.
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Figure 1: Collaborative Clustering of Massive Personal
Time-Series with Privacy Guarantees
However, the quantity of information about individuals that
fine grain personal time-series convey becomes worrying. Indeed,
a personal time-series may disclose a wide and arbitrary variety
of personal information, potentially leading to the identifica-
tion and exposure of sensitive data. For example, a time-series
containing the electrical consumption of a household recorded
at the typical sampling rate of one measure every minute is a
precise dissection of the in-home activities. At such fine grain,
domestic appliances exhibit almost-unique electrical signatures
that can then be identified accurately within the time-series
[31, 32]. Demographic information, such as number or ages of
individuals, may be inferred based on the volumes of electricity
consumed and the times of consumption; For instance, a health
status may be revealed by the presence of a clinic bed; even a
religious orientation may become highly probable when observ-
ing regular electrical patterns (e.g., the Jewish Shabbat involves
a reduced electrical activity between Friday and Saturday sun-
sets). Similar conclusions are drawn when time-series come from
different application domains (e.g., physiological measures).
The usual approach for clustering time-series is centralized; it
consists in copying the time-series from personal devices to a cen-
tral server, assumed to be trustworthy, which is then in charge
of performing clustering. However, although entrusting a single
entity with this wealth of data is practical, it is hazardous in
an untrusted world. Millions of personal records are getting ex-
posed each year due to outsider attacks, insider attacks, or basic
negligence (e.g., stolen laptop, lost post mail). Such cases feed
the news on a daily basis (see, e.g., http://datalossdb.org).
According to recent reports (e.g., [3, 34]), this trend is growing
rapidly, backed up by the ever-increasing amount of personal
data that is centralized. Thus, individuals are more and more
concerned by the systematic collection and centralization of
their personal data1. As a result, the centralized approach not
only introduces an additional risk to data privacy but also an
additional obstacle to large-scale personal data analysis.
In this paper, we address the problem of clustering personal
time-series that are massively distributed on personal devices
without jeopardizing their privacy (see Figure 1). This prob-
lem is not addressed satisfactorily by related work. First, the
common use of random parts or of generic secure multi-party
computation techniques [5, 17, 18, 19, 20] severely questions
their ability to scale with the number of participating devices
and cope with arbitrary connections/disconnections. Second,
the straightforward disclosure of data-dependent information
proposed in some work, e.g., [22, 35], jeopardizes their privacy
guarantees. When addressing this problem, we set the following
requirements for the clustering solution:
R1 Transparent execution: clustering must be performed
by the set of participating devices in a collaborative man-
ner;
R2 Private execution: no information threatening the pri-
vacy of individuals must leak from the collaborative ex-
ecution of clustering;
R3 Quality: the quality of clustering must be comparable to
that of a centralized clustering;
R4 Practicality: the performance of clustering must be ac-
ceptable in contexts where the number of participating
devices is in the order of several millions;
We propose Chiaroscuro2, a complete solution for cluster anal-
ysis over personal time-series with strong privacy guarantees.
Chiaroscuro comes with a privacy-preserving clustering algo-
rithm fully decentralized on collaborating personal devices (also
called participants in the following) that fulfills altogether the
above requirements. Through requirement R2, Chiaroscuro
relaxes the traditional desideratum that usually rules the se-
curity of distributed algorithms, allowing differentially private
intermediate results to be revealed during the execution. The
use of complex secure multi-party computation protocols is
thus avoided by operating on cleartext data, while their privacy
remains guaranteed by satisfying differential privacy.
We make the following contributions:
1. A massive distribution of the execution sequence on the
set of participating personal devices based on gossip ag-
gregation algorithms, thus fulfilling R1;
2. A data structure, called Diptych, which allows honest-but-
curious participants to collaborate while never exporting
any personal time-series out of any host device in a form
that is neither homomorphically encrypted nor differen-
tially private, thus fulfilling R2;
3. A set of heuristics designed to minimize the impact of
differential privacy on the clustering quality, thus fulfilling
R3;
1Flagship examples include the Google Health, Google
PowerMeter, and Microsoft Hohm products, abandoned because
of insufficient adoption.
2Chiaroscuro is named after the conjunction of clarity - due
to R1 - with obscurity - due to R2.
4. A thorough experimental evaluation on both real and
synthetic sets of time-series, which shows that R3 and R4
are fulfilled;
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines more
precisely the problem we tackle. Section 3 introduces necessary
concepts and techniques. Section 4 describes Chiaroscuro with
its data structure and the execution sequence, and shows its
correctness and security. Section 5 deals with the quality of
the clustering obtained. Section 6 experimentally validates the
quality and practicality of Chiaroscuro. Section 7 discusses
related work and Section 8 concludes.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1 Time-Series and Clustering
Chiaroscuro aims at clustering time-series. A time-series is
a sequence of real-valued variables. A usual representation of
a time-series s having length n is given as an ordered set of real
numbers: s=< s[1] s[2] ... s[n]>. Let S be a set of t times
series, where each time-series s in S has length n, then S can
be represented as a matrix, as follows:
S=


s1=<s1[1] ··· s1[n]>
...
...
...
st=<st[1] ··· st[n]>

 (1)
Clustering is an unsupervised learning task that aims at build-
ing a disjoint set of clusters on a dataset. Let k be a parameter
given by the end-user (1<k< t) standing for the number of
clusters to build. A disjoint set of clusters ζ={ζ[1],···,ζ[k]} is
obtained by a horizontal partitioning of S (i.e., ∪ki=1ζ[i] = S
and ∀i,j/i 6=j,ζ[i]∩ζ[j]=∅). The goal of time-series clustering
is to build such a partitioning, where similar series are grouped
together, while dissimilar series are separated in different clus-
ters. The result of clustering might be described by extension
(enumerating the content of each cluster) or by intension with
descriptors (e.g., for each cluster, statistics, or a centroid such
as a mean value).
2.2 Participants
Individuals participate in Chiaroscuro through their personal
devices (e.g., tablets, smartphones, laptops). In the rest of this
paper, we call participant a computing node that participates
in Chiaroscuro’s execution sequence. We abstract participants
by a set of assumptions about the resources they provide and
the attack model they follow.
Resources. We expect a personal device to provide average
resources: a multi-core CPU clocked at several GHz, a GB-sized
RAM, and a GB-sized non-volatile memory (at least). It is also
able to connect to the Internet at a high rate (e.g., 1-10 Mb/s).
However, since it is controlled by its owner, it does not provide
any guarantee of availability: its connections and disconnections
are arbitrary.
Attack model. A participant is called honest-but-curious
when it follows strictly the execution sequence but exploits in
any computationally-feasible way the information made avail-
able during the execution for inferring personal data. Moreover
participants may collude together up to a reasonable bound
initially fixed denoted by τ in the following.
2.3 Correctness and Security
Correctness. Chiaroscuro is correct iff (1) it terminates, and
(2) outputs at least one centroid.
Secrets. The privacy guarantees of modern encryption/per-
turbation schemes rely on the secrecy of a small set of infor-
k-means Algorithm
k Initial number of centroids.
Cinit Initial set of centroids.
θ Convergence threshold.
Epidemic Aggregation Algorithm
Λ Initial local view.
ne Number of exchanges.
Cryptographic/Privacy Schemes
χ Public encryption key.
κi Private ith key-share.
τ Key-shares threshold.
ǫ Differential privacy level.
δ Minimum probability to guarantee differential privacy.
nν Number of noise-shares to be summed up together.
Table 1: Building Blocks’ Initialization Parameters
mation such as the decryption key. We call them secrets and
denote by Ξ the set of secrets. We present them in details in
the next section.
Security.3 Chiaroscuro is secure against honest-but-curious
participants iff (1) no participant learns anything about the
input time-series that has not been perturbed by a differentially-
private mechanism (2) the uncertainty of a colluding participant
over the set of secrets decreases gracefully with the number of
collusions (which is bounded by the threshold τ).
3. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce basic concepts from cluster-
ing, distribution, and privacy-preserving techniques that are
necessary in this work. Table 1 gives the initial parameters4.
3.1 k-means Algorithm
The goal of k-means [28] is to propose k clusters that min-
imize an objective function. Usually, the objective function is
the intra-cluster inertia (Definition 1), which measures the ho-
mogeneity of the set of time-series within clusters based on their
average values, also called centroids. Let C denote the set of cen-
troids. The centroid C[i]∈C of the cluster ζ[i]∈ζ is computed as
follows: C[i]=<C[i,1]···C[i,n]> where C[i,j]= 1
|ζ[i]|
∑
∀s∈ζ[i]
s[j].
Each centroid stands for the description by intension of its
corresponding cluster.
Definition 1 (Inertia). The intra-cluster inertia of a clus-
ter ζ[i] is the weighted sum of the squared euclidean distances
between the time-series in ζ[i] and the centroid C[i]. The intra-
cluster inertia of a set of clusters ζ, denoted by qζintra, is
the sum of the intra-cluster inertia of ζi ∈ ζ: qζintra = 1t ·∑k
i=1
∑
∀s∈ζ[i]
||C[i]− s||2. The inter-cluster inertia of a set
of clusters ζ measures their heterogeneity. It is the weighted sum
of the squared euclidean distances between the clusters’ centroids
and the centroid of the complete set of time-series. We denote
it by qζinter and compute it as : q
ζ
inter=
∑k
i=1
|ζ[i]|
t
·||C[i]−g||2,
where g is the centroid of the complete set of time-series. The
full inertia of the dataset is the addition of the intra-cluster
inertia to the inter-cluster inertia : qζ=qζintra+q
ζ
inter. It is a
constant value.
3The formal statement of our security model is in the Appendix.
4Participating devices can get the set of initial parameters,
e.g., as usual by downloading it at initialization time from a
bootstrap server (which does not participate any further in the
execution sequence), possibly after an authentication step.
Given k (1<k<t, with t the number of time-series), k-means
initially sets the k initial centroids Cinit to arbitrary values and
the k clusters ζ[i]∈ζ to empty sets. Then, it proceeds as follows:
1. Assignment step: For each s∈S, get its closest centroid
C[i]∈C and assign it to the corresponding cluster ζ[i]∈ζ.
2. Computation step: For each cluster ζ[i]∈ ζ, compute
M[i] ∈ M, its corresponding candidate centroid (also
called its mean below).
3. Convergence step: If the distance between the centroids
C and the meansM is greater than θ, then set C←M and
loop to the assignment step (Step 1), otherwise returnM.
3.2 Epidemic Aggregation Algorithms
Gossip protocols are lightweight fully decentralized protocols
executed within large sets of participants. They simply consist
in periodical point-to-point exchanges of information between
participants. An initial list of IP addresses of some random par-
ticipants, called the local view, and denoted by Λ in the following,
bootstraps the exchanges. This simplicity makes gossip-based
protocols easy to implement and highly scalable. Moreover, high
levels of robustness and resistance to failures can be achieved by
merging the local views at each exchange between participants
[25]. Epidemic aggregation algorithms follow the gossip principles
for computing approximations of global aggregates, such as sums
or averages, over massively distributed data [23, 21]. Each partic-
ipant holds its own approximation of the global aggregate, called
the local state, and updates it, at each exchange, with the local
state of the other participant through the local update rule. The
approximation error depends on the number of gossip exchanges
per participant and is guaranteed to converge to zero exponen-
tially fast [21, 23]. Moreover, since the number of exchanges per
participant is a parameter (denoted by ne), it can be set so that
the approximation error is as small as desired (i.e., typically
several orders of magnitude lower than the exact aggregate value
[21], as illustrated in our experiments and shown in Appendix B).
Chiaroscuro is based on the epidemic computation of sums.
In a context where the data is not sensitive, the epidemic sum al-
gorithm proceeds as follows [23]. The local state of a participant
i is made of a sum, denoted by σi, and a weight, denoted by ωi.
Each participant initializes σi to its local data and ωi to zero5
and starts its exchanges, updating σi and ωi at each exchange.
The local update rule simply consists in adding half of the local
σi value (resp. ωi) to half of the other participant’s σj value
(resp. ωj). The local estimate of the global sum is σi/ωi.
3.3 Encryption and Perturbation Schemes
3.3.1 Additively-Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Chiaroscuro is independent of any specific encryption scheme
provided that it satisfies the following properties:
1. Semantic security[14]: Stated informally, semantic se-
curity implies that, given a ciphertext, the public encryp-
tion key, and, some information about the plaintext, no
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is able to gain
additional knowledge on the plaintext. In particular, se-
mantically secure schemes are not deterministic ;
2. Additively-homomorphic: Two encrypted integers can
be added together to yield a correct encryption of their
addition. Let a and b be two integers, χ be the encryption
key and κ the decryption key, and +h be the homomorphic
addition operator, then: Dκ(Eχ(a)+hEχ(b))==a+b;
5One participant, no matter which one, must initialize ωi to
one. This is easily done in practice, e.g., through a dedicated
machine acting as a participant.
3. Non-interactive threshold decryption: The decryp-
tion key is a set of nκ key-shares {κi} so that decrypting
a message requires to decrypt it partially by at least
τ ≤nκ distinct key-shares. Each partial decryption can
be performed independently of the others;
The Damgard-Jurik encryption scheme [8] is an instance of
such schemes:
1. Encryption key: The public encryption key is χ=(n,g),
where n is an RSA modulus (the product of two large
prime numbers) and g an element of the computation
space, i.e., the finite field Z∗ns+1 (with s > 0 a positive
integer);
2. Decryption key-shares: Each decryption key-share κi
is a point of a polynom of degree τ (so that τ points are
necessary for knowing the polynom), where τ≤nκ is the
key-shares threshold. The polynom is part of the set of
secrets Ξ;
3. Encryption: The encryption of an integer a is Eχ(a)=
ga ·rns mod ns+1 where r∈Z∗ns+1 is a random number;
4. Homomorphic addition: The additively-homomorphic
addition operator is simply the product between the two
encrypted values: Eχ(a)+hEχ(b)=Eχ(a)×Eχ(b);
5. Decryption: Decryption is essentially performed by de-
crypting partially the encrypted value by at least τ≤nκ
distinct key-shares, and by computing the product of the
τ partial decryptions. A partial decryption consists basi-
cally in raising the encrypted value to a power that is a
multiple of κi;
3.3.2 Differential Privacy and Laplace Perturbation
The ǫ-differential privacy model [10] (see Definition 2) requires
that whatever the output of a (differentially-private) aggregation
function, the probability that any given individual’s data d was
in the input is indistinguishable from the probability that d was
not in the input. In our context, the aggregation function is the
(time-series) sum, denoted by Sum in the following. It inputs a
set of time-series, each of length n, and outputs their dimension-
wise sum, i.e., a single time-series of length n too where the
variable at the ith dimension is the sum of the variables at the
ith dimension of all the time-series input.
Definition 2 (ǫ-differential privacy from [10]). Sum
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if, given the privacy parameter
ǫ>0: Pr(Sum(S1)∈I)≤eǫ ·Pr(Sum(S2)∈I) for any set I and
any set of time-series S1 and S2 such that S2 can be obtained
from S1 by inserting or deleting one individual’s time-series.
In Chiaroscuro, the massive distribution of the differential
privacy mechanism is based on approximate epidemic aggre-
gation algorithms (see Section 3.2). In order to cope with the
inherent approximation error, we relax the ǫ-differential privacy
to a probabilistic variant, namely the (ǫ,δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy6 (Definition 3). The (ǫ,δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy introduces a tradeoff between privacy and latency: to-
gether with other parameters, the value of δ determines the
number of exchanges of the epidemic aggregation algorithms
(see Appendix B).
Definition 3 (Probabilistic Differential Privacy).
Sum satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy if, given the
privacy parameters ǫ>0 and δ∈]0,1], Sum satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy with a probability greater than or equal to δ.
6A probabilistic relaxation of differential privacy, similar in
spirit to our variant, was also proposed in [29].
A crucial property of the (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
model is its composability: a set of n independent aggregates,
each satisfying (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, satisfies
(
∑n
i=1
ǫi, δn)-probabilistic differential privacy. Hence, the ǫ
privacy level initially fixed can be seen as a privacy budget to
be distributed across the various aggregates to perturb.
The ǫ-differential privacy model can be satisfied by perturbing
the true results of the aggregation function through the Laplace
mechanism so that the impact of any individual on the result is
overwhelmed by the perturbation introduced [12]. The pertur-
bation, called noise in the rest of the paper, is chosen at random
in a Laplace distribution centered at 0 with a scale factor that
depends on the privacy parameter ǫ and on the sensitivity of the
sum function, i.e., the maximum impact that an insertion/dele-
tion of an individual’s time-series can incur on its output. The
exact value of the noise is part of the set of secrets Ξ.
Definition 4 (Laplace mechanism from [12]). Let L(λ)
denote a random variable which has a Laplace distribution
with probability density function f(x,λ) = 1
2λ
· e−|x|/λ. Let
S1 and S2 be any two sets of time-series such that S2 can be
obtained from S1 by inserting or deleting one individual’s time-
series, and [dmin,dmax] be the possible range of each variable
in a time-series. The Laplace mechanism consists in adding
L(max‖Sum(S1)−Sum(S2)‖1/ǫ) = L(n∗max(|dmin|,|dmax|)/ǫ)
to each variable of the time-series output by Sum.
Lemma 1 states that a Laplace random variable can be gener-
ated by summing together an arbitrary number of independently
identically distributed random variables formally defined in Def-
inition 5 and called noise-shares7.
Lemma 1 (Divisibility of Laplace from [24]). Let L(λ)
denote a random variable that has a Laplace distribution with
probability density function f(x,λ)= 1
2λ
·e−|x|/λ. Then the dis-
tribution of L(λ) is infinitely divisible. Furthermore, for every
integer nν≥1, L(λ)=
∑nν
i=1
(νi) where each νi is a noise-share
independently generated as defined in Definition 5 .
Definition 5 (Noise-Share). A noise share νi is a ran-
dom variable computed as follows: νi = G1(nν,λ)−G2(nν,λ)),
where nν is the total number of noise-shares to be summed
up together, and G1(nν, λ) and G2(nν, λ) are i.i.d. random
variables having gamma distribution with PDF g(x,nν,λ) =
(1/λ)1/nν
γ(1/nν)
·x 1nν −1 ·e−x/λ where x≥0.
4. CHIAROSCURO
In designing Chiaroscuro, we must cope with highly con-
strained challenges related to clustering, distribution and privacy.
In this section, we propose our solutions for each of these chal-
lenges and show that the complete resulting execution sequence
is both correct and secure. For simplifying the presentation, we
defer to Section 5 the issues related to quality, including the
management of the privacy budget.
4.1 Diptych Data Structure
Parallelizability is a crucial property in our massively dis-
tributed context, making a clustering algorithm such as k-
means [28] especially relevant. However, exploiting it without
any security safeguard would jeopardize privacy irremediably. A
strong rethinking of its execution is thus essential. A traditional
7This well-known mathematical property is also used in [1].
However, the fault-tolerance needed in our context and the
absence of central entity yields a significantly different noise
generation algorithm (see Sections 4 and 7).
centralized k-means iteration consists in (1) partitioning the
dataset according to the k centroids input by assigning each
time-series to the closest centroid, and (2) computing the cen-
ters of mass of the resulting partitions, i.e., the k means. The
k-means algorithm is thus essentially based on a twofold data
structure made of the centroids on one side and the means on
the other side.
Our approach fundamentally stems from a major recast of
this data structure and, consequently, of the execution sequence
that manipulates it. We design Chiaroscuro so that partici-
pants perform (1) the assignment step on differentially private
cleartext centroids and (2) the computation step on additively-
homomorphic encrypted means. The resulting data structure,
consisting in the differentially private centroids and the en-
crypted means, is called Diptych. The means part of the Diptych
structure must be designed carefully because it must support
the epidemic sum algorithm, which relies on a specific weighted
data representation (see Section 3), and cope with the fact
that data is additively-homomorphic encrypted, which excludes
performing any division before decryption. The Diptych data
structure is detailed in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Diptych Data Structure). A Diptych
follows the form (C,M) where any C[i] ∈ C is a cleartext per-
turbed centroid, and any M[i]∈M is an encrypted mean. M[i]
is represented by (s=Eχ(σsum),c=Eχ(σcount),ω), where E is the
additively-homomorphic encryption scheme, χ the encryption
key, Eχ(σsum) and Eχ(σcount) denote the encrypted epidemic
representations of the mean’s sum (a time-series) and its count
(a real value), respectively, with ω their complementary weight.
We emphasize that any information that depends on the par-
ticipant’s data is either encrypted (the sum and count parts
of the epidemic representation) or perturbed by a differentially
private mechanism (the centroids). We let the weight appear
harmlessly in the clear because it is independent of the data.
4.2 Execution Sequence
The Diptych data structure is key for Chiaroscuro’s execution
sequence. This sequence is iterative, fully distributed on each
participant, and proceeds without any global synchronization
(the late participants simply synchronize on the latest iteration
during their gossip exchanges). Basically, each iteration com-
putes the set of means in an encrypted manner, perturbs them
by a differentially private mechanism without decrypting them,
and finally decrypts them. It consists of the following steps
performed in loop until the centroids converge (see Algorithm 1
for the full execution sequence):
1. Assignment step: the local participant assigns its data
to the closest centroid in C and initializes (1) the corre-
sponding encrypted mean in M with its local time-series
(dimension-wise) encrypted and (2) the other means with
k−1 zero-valued time-series (dimension-wise) encrypted;
2. Computation step: Compute M, the set of perturbed
means of the new clusters:
(a) Epidemic computation of the encrypted means;
(b) Epidemic perturbation of the encrypted means;
(c) Epidemic decryption of the perturbed encrypted
means;
3. Convergence step: if the distance between C andM is
greater than θ, then C←M and loop to the assignment
step (Step 1), otherwise returnM.
The assignment and convergence steps are both performed on
cleartext data, so they do not present strong challenges. This is
Algorithm 1: Full execution sequence run by each
participant
Req.: The local data: a time-series s.
The security parameters: the public encryption
key χ, a private decryption key-share κi, the
differential privacy level ǫ, the number of noise-shares nν.
The epidemic parameters: an initial local view Λ,
the required number of exchanges ne.
The k-means parameters: the initial vector of k
centroids Cinit and the maximum number of iterations nmaxit .
1 Let C denote the vector of centroids,M denote the
vector of intermediate perturbed decrypted means, M.s the
vector of the encrypted sums of means, and M.c the vector
of the encrypted counts of means: C=Cinit,M={∅}.
2 Let cv=false and nit=0.
3 while cv== false and nit≤nmaxit do
4 begin Assignment step:
5 Compute the centroid that is the closest to s, C[j].
6 Initialize the encrypted means: M[j].s=
{Eχ(si)}∀si∈s, M[j].c=Eχ(1); and ∀i 6=j : M[i].s=
{Eχ(0)}, M[l].c=Eχ(0); and ω=0 for all means.
7 begin Computation step:
8 M=ComputationStep(M, χ, κi, ǫ, nν, Λ, ne).
9 (See Alg. 3 for details.)
10 begin Convergence step:
11 if HasConverged(C, M)==true then cv=true ;
12 else C=M ;
13 Increment the number of iterations : nit++ (see Sec. 5).
14 Return M
the computation step, detailed in Algorithm 3, that concentrates
the three unsolved points of the execution sequence: the compu-
tation of the encrypted means (Section 4.2.1), their differentially
private perturbation (Section 4.2.2), and finally their decryption
(Section 4.2.3)8.
4.2.1 Epidemic Computation of the Encrypted Means
The epidemic algorithm for computing the encrypted means,
called EESum in the following, consists in performing repeated
point-to-point exchanges of the encrypted means of the current
Diptych data structure. Each participant picks at random a con-
tact in its local view with which it exchanges its own encrypted
means. Both update their respective Diptych and can then
start another exchange if the number of exchanges sufficient
for the epidemic sum to converge (fixed beforehand) has not
been reached. The local update rule is specifically designed to
cope with additively-homomorphic encrypted data: any division
of encrypted data is delayed until its decryption so that only
additions and scalar multiplications are performed. Algorithm 2
gives the local update rule of the EESum algorithm.
4.2.2 Epidemic Noise Generation
The perturbation function consists in adding a controlled
amount of noise to each encrypted mean before its decryption.
It must necessarily be performed in a collaborative manner so
that no single participant knows the exact value of noise (which
8Note that when a cluster is small, the perturbation of its
(low) mean shall give an irrelevant value. As a side-effect, such
an outlying mean will simply be ignored de facto in the next
iterations (no time series will correspond to it). Thus, our
experiments show the number of clusters varying according to
these “lost” means (Section 6).
Algorithm 2: Local update rule over encrypted data
Input : The public encryption key χ, the encrypted current
local value Eχ(vl), the current local weight ωl,
the current local number of exchanges performed
so far nl, the encrypted current remote value
Eχ(vr), the current remote weight ωr, the current
remote number of exchanges performed so far nr.
1 if nr 6=nl then One value has to be scaled to be added
2 if nr>nl; then Local value that must be scaled
3 Eχ(vl) = Eχ(vl) ×h2nr−nl ; ωl = ωl ×2nr−nl ;
4 else Remote value must be scaled
5 Eχ(vr) = Eχ(vr) ×h2nl−nr ; ωr = ωr ×2nl−nr ;
6 Eχ(vl) = Eχ(vl) +h Eχ(vr); nl= MAX(nl, nr) +1;
could otherwise be subtracted from the decrypted mean). In
our context, the two parts of each encrypted mean must be per-
turbed, i.e., its sum (a time-series) and its count (a real value).
The epidemic perturbation function essentially amounts to the
epidemic generation of k∗(n+1) Laplace random variables. It
relies on two keystones: the Divisibility of Laplace lemma
(see Lemma 1 in Section 3) and the EESum algorithm. Roughly,
participants generate the noise-shares independently, as defined
in Definition 5, and sum them up together through the EESum
algorithm.
More precisely, each generated Laplace noise must satisfy two
properties:
• Correctness: the noise must result from the sum of ex-
actly nν distinct noise-shares (where nν is a parameter
fixed beforehand);
• Unicity: the noise must be unique among the set of
participants;
A straightforward value for the number of noise-shares is the
size of the population, provided it is known beforehand. The
noise generation is similar to the encrypted means computa-
tion: each participant generates a noise-share, encrypts it, and
participates to the epidemic encrypted sum for approximating
the global sum of the noise shares. However, the population
size may not be known exactly in practice. The noise gener-
ation algorithm must be slightly adapted for this. First, the
number of noise shares nν is set to an under-estimation of the
population size, e.g., to the estimated maximal lower bound.
Thus, the epidemic noise generation will thus involve more noise
shares than necessary: it can be corrected to involve the exact
number of noise shares. Second, a cleartext counter, counting
the number of nodes having actually participated in the noise
generation, comes with the encrypted sum. A count being sim-
ply a sum of 1’s, it follows the usual epidemic representation.
The surplus of noise shares can now be estimated by subtract-
ing nν to the actual value of the counter. Third, in order to
guarantee the unicity property, i.e., that all participants apply
the same correction, each participant disseminates its locally
generated correction, together with a random identifier. When
participants disseminate their corrections, each one always keeps
the correction associated to the smallest identifier. The prob-
ability of an incomplete dissemination is easily made negligible
by standard dissemination protocols [23].
The two executions of the EESum algorithm - one for the
encrypted means and one for their respective noise vectors - run
in parallel. Their stopping criterion is the number of epidemic
exchanges to perform for guaranteeing their convergence on the
set of participants. After the sums, participants generate the
noise corrections with their identifiers, and disseminate them,
Algorithm 3: Computation step
Input : The encrypted means M, the public
encryption key χ, the private decryption key-share
κi, the differential privacy level ǫ, the number
of noise-shares nν, the local view Λ, the number
of epidemic exchanges ne necessary for the epidemic
sum to converge (see Appendix B for fixing ne).
1 begin Epidemic computation of encrypted means
2 Background epidemic sums: Launch in background
the encrypted epidemic algorithms for computing
the encrypted means: M=EESum(M, Λ, ne, χ).
3 begin Epidemic noise generation
4 Local noise-shares generation: Generate the vectors
of noise-shares: N .s and N .c where each noise-share νi=
GenNoise(ǫ, nν). Set the epidemic counter ctr to 1.
5 Epidemic noise computation: Launch in background
the encrypted epidemic sum algorithms dedicated
to noise-shares: N=EESum(N , Λ, ne, χ), and
the epidemic count algorithm: ctr=EpiSum(Λ, ne).
6 Epidemic noise correction: If ctr>nν generate
a correction vector cor=
∑
ctr−nν
1
GenNoise(ǫ, nν)
and a random identifier idcor for
each of the noise vectors. Disseminate each epidemically
cor=EpiDis(cor,idcor), and subtract each
final correction vector to its respective noise vector.
7 Encrypted perturbation: Add the
vector of encrypted sums (resp. counts) to its vector of
encrypted noises: M.s=M.s+hN .s and M.c=M.c+hN .c.
8 begin Epidemic decryption
9 Local partial decryption: Choose a random local key-
share identifier idk and decrypt partiallyM.s andM.cwith
the local key-share: S=Dκi(M.s) and K=Dκi(M.c).
10 Epidemic decryption: Launch
the epidemic decryption: S=EEDec(M.s, S, idk,
Λ, κi)/M.ω and K=EEDec(M.c, K, idk, Λ, κi)/M.ω.
11 Compute the vector of perturbed means: M=S/K.
12 Smooth the vector of perturbed means:
M=Smooth(M) (see Sec. 5).
13 Return M.
keeping the one with the smallest identifier at each exchange.
The stopping criterion for the epidemic dissemination is also
the number of exchanges necessary for convergence. Finally,
when the dissemination terminates, each participant adds the
corrected converged encrypted noises to the converged encrypted
means to obtain the perturbed encrypted means and is now
ready to launch their epidemic decryption.
4.2.3 Epidemic Decryption
Similarly to the epidemic noise generation algorithm, epidemic
decryption must be performed collaboratively, and be both cor-
rect and unique. First, collaboration is achieved based on the
threshold decryption feature of the Damgard-Jurik encryption
scheme (1) by assigning one key-share to each participant (e.g.,
when it acquires the parameters) and (2) by decrypting partially
the means at each epidemic decryption exchange. Second, unic-
ity is trivially enforced through the convergence properties of
the epidemic sum algorithm. Indeed, both the encrypted means
and the encrypted noise vectors are guaranteed to be unique
among the set of participants. Participants can decrypt them
concurrently without threatening the unicity property. Third,
correctness requires to apply exactly t distinct key-shares to
the encrypted means of each participant. To this end, each
participant is equipped with (1) a random key-share identifier
and (2) a set storing the identifiers of the key-shares that have
partially decrypted its current means. During an epidemic de-
cryption exchange, both participants check that their respective
set of identifiers does not already contain that of the other.
Additionally, decryption latency can be reduced by erasing and
replacing the partially decrypted means of the less advanced
participant with that of the more advanced participant. The
stopping criterion of the epidemic decryption algorithm is the
equality between the cardinality of the set of key-shares applied
and the required number of key-shares.
4.2.4 Termination
The traditional centralized termination criterion of k-means is
centroids convergence. However, the convergence threshold is an
arbitrary parameter that fixes a limit on the distance between
two consecutive sets of centroids. Convergence becomes hard to
guarantee when centroids are perturbed to satisfy differential
privacy. In order to still guarantee termination (and to avoid
exceeding the privacy parameters ǫ and δ), we simply limit the
number of iterations to be executed. The termination criterion is
thus the disjunction between the convergence of centroids and a
limit on the number of iterations (denoted by nmaxit in the follow-
ing). Section 5 discusses strategies dedicated to the production
of high-quality centroids in a reduced number of iterations as
well as the use of a smarter termination criterion that depends
on the evolution of the centroids quality along iterations.
4.3 Correctness and Security
Theorem 1 states the correctness of Chiaroscuro and Theo-
rem 2 states its security. We refer the interested reader to the
Appendix for the proofs.
Theorem 1. Any instance π of Chiaroscuro (Algorithm 1)
executed on a set of honest-but-curious participants is correct.
Theorem 2. Any instance π of Chiaroscuro (Algorithm 1)
executed on a set of honest-but-curious participants is secure.
4.4 Extensions to Malicious Attackers
Chiaroscuro can be extended to cope with malicious attackers
that deviate from the execution sequence. First, the security of
participants can be increased by benefiting from the current rise
of highly secure trusted execution environments embedded into
personal devices (such as, e.g., in [2]) so that tampering the exe-
cution sequence, which amounts to tampering the code executed,
becomes prohibitively costly. Note that data integrity can also be
enforced by these environments, hence countering “lying” mali-
cious participants. Second, the population of participants can be
strengthened by restricting the access to the execution sequence
to the set of authorized devices through usual authentication
techniques. Finally, the collaborative nature of the execution
sequence (transparency requirement R1) is a sound basis for
detecting malicious attacks thanks to the systematic dissemina-
tion of malicious behaviors (e.g., checking that decrypted values
are all equal across participants (epidemic dissemination)).
5. CLUSTERING QUALITY
Chiaroscuro discloses the centroids produced by each k-means
iteration in order to achieve both scalability and fault-tolerance,
and protects them through an appropriate, differentially private,
perturbation scheme. However, the injection of noise in each in-
termediate result of the k-means algorithm has an impact on the
quality of the final centroids. Naive strategies may even totally
thwart the algorithm by injecting an overwhelming amount of
noise. This section is dedicated to maintaining the quality of the
clustering with perturbation, to a level comparable to the level
reached by clustering with no perturbation, which corresponds to
requirement R3. Two levels can be delved into for reducing the
impact of the perturbation: the quality of the sequence of cen-
troids (Section 5.1) and the quality of each centroid (Section 5.2).
5.1 Budget Concentration Strategies
A naive privacy budget distribution strategy could consist
roughly in estimating the number nit of iterations needed for a
centralized k-means to converge, setting the maximum number
of iterations to nit, and assigning a budget equal to ǫ/nit to
each iteration. However, the estimated number of iterations
may be high depending on the dataset, the k-means convergence
threshold, and the initial centroids. Hence, a relevant solution is
to concentrate the budget on the first iterations. The k-means
algorithm is well-known for its logarithmic error loss rate [4]: the
highest gains in quality are obtained during the first iterations.
We propose three proofs-of-concept budget concentration
strategies that strive to preserve the quality of the centroids
produced during the first iterations:
• GREEDY (G): The GREEDY strategy (G for short)
favors the first iterations through an exponential decrease
in the budget assignment: 1/2i of the budget is assigned
to the ith iteration. Since
∑
1/2i is bounded by 1, the
privacy budget finally spent never exceeds ǫ;
• GREEDY_FLOOR (GF): The GREEDY_FLOOR
strategy (GF for short) spreads each GREEDY assignment
on a floor of f iterations. Each of the first f iterations
is assigned 1/(2f) of the budget, each of the second f,
1/(22f), and so forth. The budget assignment is thus
exponential by floor;
• UNIFORM_FAST (UF): TheUNIFORM_FAST strat-
egy (UF for short) bounds the number of iterations to
a strong limit (e.g., nit=5) and distributes the budget
uniformly among them. The budget assignment is thus
constant but limited to a reduced number of iterations;
The magnitude of the noise added by G and GF strategies
increases with the number of iterations, possibly leading to a
noise overwhelming the centroids before termination, and conse-
quently to their non-convergence. Nevertheless, termination is
still guaranteed by the limit on the number of iterations. (It is
easy to make the termination criterion smarter by identifying the
moment at which the noise becomes intractable and stop at that
moment9. For simplicity, this work focuses on the criterion de-
scribed above.) Other strategies can be designed, experimented,
and finally plugged into Chiaroscuro if they lead to better results.
5.2 Smoothing the Means
After being perturbed, a meanM[i] might be far from its value
prior to perturbation. In this case, data assigned to ζ[i] will prob-
ably be re-assigned to ζ[j] where j 6=i, which is against the con-
vergence criterion of k-means. However, the noise added to each
9Participants can monitor the centroids quality through the
inter-cluster inertia (Definition 1): (1) the cardinality of each
cluster is already computed during the means computation
and (2) the center of mass of the full dataset and its cardinality
can be easily computed based on the encrypted gossip sum
algorithm and the distributed noise generation, once and for
all, before launching Chiaroscuro. Chiaroscuro would then stop
when the quality starts to drop.
Dataset
Number of time-series 3M (CER), 1.2M (NUMED)
Size of time-series 24 (CER), 20 (NUMED)
Privacy
Key size 1024 bits
Key-shares threshold τ∈ [0.001%,10%]
Privacy budget ǫ=0.69
Nb of noise-shares nν=100%
k-means
Initial nb of centroids k=50
GOSSIP
Size of the local view 30
Churn From 10% to 50%
Quality
Floor size (G) 4
Max nb of iterations nmaxit =5 (UF only), n
max
it =10
Moving average (SMA) 20%
Table 2: Experimental Parameters
measure is a Laplace random variable: it can be positive or nega-
tive with equal probability. Therefore, given a sliding window of
size w+1, we can smooth the values of the sum part ofM[i], i.e.,
S[i], by averaging them as follows. Let S[i]=<S[i,1]...S[i,n]>
be the sum part after perturbation and S[i,j] be the smoothed
value of S[i,j]. Let m(S[i,j]) be the jth (modulo n) value in
S[i], then S[i,j]=(m(S[i,j−w/2])+...+m(S[i,j+w/2]))/(w+1).
After having been smoothed by this simple moving average
technique (denoted by SMA hereafter), the new mean is ready
for the next iteration, guaranteeing both privacy (the output
of a function performed on a differentially private input is dif-
ferentially private too) and a better stability of k-means.
6. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
6.1 Settings
We have implemented Chiaroscuro’s execution sequence and
integrated it into Peersim [30], a well-known distributed comput-
ing simulator. This implementation is a strong proof of concept
and allows us to run experiments over medium-sized populations
(e.g., tenths of thousands of participants) on a single machine.
However, experiments involving very large scale populations
(e.g., several millions of participants) would need a testing plat-
form deployable over a number of nodes sufficient for coping
with the load. To the best of our knowledge, such a platform is
not available today. As a result, in order to launch experiments
on very large scale populations, we evaluate: (1) the local costs
(i.e., CPU times and bandwidth consumption) by performing
encryptions, decryptions, and encrypted additions on a typical
participant, (2) the quality (i.e., intra-cluster inertia) by running
a perturbed centralized k-means implementation embedding our
budget concentration strategies and means smoothing technique,
and (3) the latency (i.e., average number of messages per par-
ticipant) by simulating the epidemic sum, dissemination, and
decryption algorithms. Moreover, because of their arbitrary con-
nection patterns, participants may join or leave an ongoing run
of Chiaroscuro at any moment of its execution. The resulting
churn impacts the quality of centroids (1) by making unavailable
a random fraction of the population at each gossip exchange and
(2) by dynamically changing the input set of time-series at each k-
means iteration. We also evaluate these two aspects below with a
fixed latency. The parameters values we used are synthesized in
Table 2. They consist in typical values met in practical contexts.
6.1.1 Experimental Platform
In real-life, Chiaroscuro would be executed on a variety of desk-
tops, tablets, smartphones, or laptops. All are equipped today
with GB RAM and multi-core CPU. The experiments have been
run on such hardware: a laptop containing an eight-core 2.6 GHz
CPU with 8 GB RAM. The programming language was Java 7.
We evaluate Chiaroscuro with respect to a real dataset and
a synthetic one, each related to a targeted application domain:
• CER The CER dataset [16] contains the electricity con-
sumption time-series of thousands of Irish homes and
businesses collected between 2009 and 2010 at the rate of
one sample every half hour. In our experiments, we use
three millions daily time-series randomly sampled from
the dataset and reduced to twenty-four measures each
(electricity consumption per hour). The range of each
measure is [0,80] (sum sensitivity thus equals to 1920).
• NUMED The NUMED dataset is a set of 1.2 million
time-series representing the tumor growth of cancer suffer-
ing patients. It was synthetically generated based on math-
ematical models of typical profiles [7] (at this scale, real
health-related time-series are hard to access), at the rate of
one sample every week, and for twenty weeks per patient.
Each time-series contains one measure per week taking
its value in [0,50] (sum sensitivity thus equal to 1000).
6.1.2 Settings: Local Costs
Three parameters fully determine the bandwidth consumption
and the computation times of a participant. First, the number
of clusters, initially set to k=50. Second, the size of a mean,
equal to the size of a time-series (i.e., twenty-four measures
for the CER dataset and twenty measures for the NUMED
dataset). Third, the length (in bits) of an encrypted value in
a mean. It is similar to the size of the cryptographic key, which
we set to 1024 bits in our experiments (average security). The
linear relationship between these parameters and the local costs
is simple, making easy to estimate the costs corresponding to
other values for these parameters.
6.1.3 Settings: Quality
The perturbed centralized k-means satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy where ǫ is set to a common value [11]:
ǫ = ln2 = 0.69. Since the value of δ has no impact on the
centroids quality, we can simply ignore it here10. The floor-size
of the GREEDY_FLOOR strategy was set to 4. We set the
initial number of clusters to k=50. For the synthetic NUMED
dataset, the initial centroids are chosen uniformly at random
within the set of (synthetic) time-series. For the CER dataset,
they are generated by CourboGen [9], the EDF bigdata gener-
ator (obvious privacy reasons preclude raw real-life time-series
to be used as initial centroids).
6.1.4 Settings : Latency
The execution sequence of Chiaroscuro is made of two epi-
demic encrypted sums and one epidemic decryption. We eval-
uate experimentally the average number of messages per par-
ticipant (1) to compute local approximations of the global sum,
and (2) to decrypt the encrypted perturbed means. In order
to exhibit the tendency of each curve, we vary the size of the
10In practice the δ parameter is set to a value close to 1. The
larger the value of δ, the larger the number of gossip exchanges.
Theorem 3 (from [25] - see Appendix B) shows that with the
current connectivity layer of Chiaroscuro, high δ values (e.g.,
δ=0.995) can be reached with a reasonable number of gossip
exchanges (e.g., ne=47).
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
in
e
rt
ia
#iteration
190
200 Dataset inertia
No perturbation
UF_SMA (10 it.)
UF (10 it.)
UF_SMA (5 it.)
UF (5 it.)
G_SMA
G
GF_SMA (4 it./oor)
GF (4 it./oor)
(a) CER: Evolution of the Pre-Perturbation Intra-
Cluster Inertia
 30
 40
 50
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
in
e
rt
ia
#iteration
 890 Dataset inertia
No perturbation
UF_SMA (10 it.)
UF_SMA (5 it.)
G_SMA
GF_SMA (4 it./oor)
(b) NUMED: Evolution of the Pre-Perturbation Intra-
Cluster Inertia
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
n
u
m
b
. 
o
f 
c
e
n
tr
o
id
s
#iteration
Initial number
No perturbation
UF_SMA (10 it.)
UF (10 it.)
UF_SMA (5 it.)
UF (5 it.)
G_SMA
G
GF_SMA (4 it./oor)
GF (4 it./oor)
(c) CER: Evolution of the Number of Centroids
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(d) NUMED: Evolution of the Number of Centroids
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Figure 2: Quality of the Perturbed Clustering - CER: 3M time-series and NUMED : 1.2M time-series
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Figure 5: Unitary Local Costs for a Set of 50 Means, 20 Measures per Mean, and a 1024 Bits Encryption Key
population from np=1K participants to np=1M. We set the
size of the local view per participant to nΛ=30 participants (an
average case [21]). For the encrypted epidemic sum, we set the
local data of any participant to a single integer value equal to 1,
and launch the experiments for several absolute approximation
errors targeted, i.e., from 0.001 to 1. Concerning the epidemic
decryption, this is the number of key-shares needed for decryp-
tion that we vary, expressed as a fraction of the population size,
i.e., from τ=0.001% to τ=10%.
6.1.5 Settings : Impact of Churn on Quality
We model the churn as the uniform probability for each par-
ticipant to be disconnected (1) at each gossip exchange of the
epidemic encrypted sum and (2) at each perturbed k-means
iteration. For the former, we measure the relative error of the
encrypted epidemic sum for a number of participants varying
from np=1K to np=1M, a number of messages per participant
equal to 100 on average, all participants having as local data
a single integer equal to 1, and for three disconnection proba-
bilities (at each gossip exchange) of 10%, 25%, and 50%. For
the later, we measure the evolution of the intra-cluster inertia
during the perturbed k-means clustering of the CER dataset in
the same setting with no-churn one and with the above three
disconnection probabilities (at each iteration).
6.2 Clustering Quality
We evaluate the impact of the perturbation on the clustering
quality by monitoring the evolutions along the iterations of the
k-means algorithm of (1) the intra-cluster inertia (both prior to
perturbation and after) (2) the number of centroids. We run
each experiment ten times and plot the average values. For
keeping the figures readable, we do not plot the confidence
intervals but give them in the corresponding paragraph.
Figure 2(a) shows the evolution of the intra-cluster inertia
along the first ten iterations of the k-means algorithm executed
over the CER dataset. We plot (1) the full inertia of the
dataset (a constant, the worstcase upper bound of the intra-
cluster inertia), (2) the evolution of the intra-cluster inertia in
the traditional unperturbed k-means (a decreasing logarithm,
the best-case lower bound), and (3) the evolution of the intra-
cluster inertia in the perturbed k-means before perturbing the
centroids. Each budget concentration strategy is shown, both
with the means smoothing and without. Globally, the inertia
in the perturbed cases stay close to the lower bound, especially
during the first iterations where the k-means error loss rate is
at its highest. The strategy that reaches the best inertia level is
GREEDY (third to fifth iteration). For all strategies, the SMA
smoothing positively impacts inertia. Figure 2(c) also shows that
GREEDY with SMA smoothing preserves the highest number
of centroids. This high number of centroids further explains
partially the difference between its pre-perturbation inertia
and its post-perturbation inertia shown in Figure 2(e) (where
aberrant centroids unable to cope with the noise, as explained
in Section 4.2, have been removed). Similar conclusions can
be drawn with the NUMED dataset (Figures 2(b), 2(d), and
2(f)). We do not plot the inertia reached without smoothing
because they are very close to the inertia reached with it. This
can be explained by the distribution of data: the NUMED time-
series are equally distributed across the clusters (contrary to the
strongly concentrated CER time-series), keeping low the number
of small clusters, i.e., those that benefit the most from smoothing
because of their high sensitivity to noise. Whatever the dataset
and budget distribution strategy, the confidence intervals of the
evolution of the inertia and number of centroids are similar,
small, and stable during the first iterations (i.e., ±2.5 points
(resp. 1) for the CER (resp. NUMED) inertia, and ±2 points
(resp. 1) for the CER (resp. NUMED) number of centroids)
but they diverge when the noise starts to overwhelm centroids.
6.3 Performance
6.3.1 Local Bandwidth and Time Consumption
Figure 5 shows the minimum, maximum, and average time
and bandwidth consumption per participant for a Peersim ex-
ecution of Chiaroscuro with 20 measures per mean. Figure 5(a)
shows the time required for encrypting a set of means, decrypting
it, and adding together two sets of encrypted means. The decryp-
tion time represents the highest cost. However, being executed
only once during an iteration and staying below a few seconds
in our experiments, it remains affordable when executed in back-
ground by the participant. The addition of two sets of encrypted
means is the most frequent operation. The time it consumes is
below 0.1 second, i.e., two orders of magnitude lower than the de-
cryption times. Figure 5(b) shows the bandwidth consumption,
in kilo-bytes, for transferring a set of encrypted means. A hun-
dredth of kilo-bytes per transfer are necessary, which amounts
to around 1 second for a humble 1 Mb/s connection speed. The
epidemic sum algorithm requires two encrypted means transfers
and the once per iteration epidemic decryption algorithm trans-
fers both the encrypted means and their partially decrypted
version - the equivalent of four encrypted means. Both algo-
rithms thus transfer a few hundredth of kilo-bytes per epidemic
exchange, which is clearly affordable given today’s bandwidths.
6.3.2 Global Latency
Figure 4(a) depicts the number of messages for performing
an encrypted epidemic sum given absolute approximation errors
varying from ±0.001 to ±1. The number of messages remains
very low, i.e., under the hundred, even for a million participants
population with the tightest absolute approximation error of
±0.001 (i.e., equal to 10−9 the exact sum value)11. Moreover,
the figure clearly shows that the number of messages grows
logarithmically depending on the population size. On the same
figure, we plot the dissemination latency of the smallest identifier
noise correction. It remains in the same order of magnitude, and
depends logarithmically too on the population size. Figure 4(b)
shows the average number of messages per participant for per-
forming epidemic decryption with respect to the key-shares
threshold expressed as a fraction of the population size. The de-
cryption latency exhibits a linear behavior depending on the size
of the threshold. For one million participants, our experiments
reach the limit of the experimental platform at a threshold size
greater than 0.01% the population size. However, the linearity
of the curves lets forecast a number of messages on the order of
magnitude of the hundred for a realistic threshold size of 0.01%
(i.e., 100 distinct participants to contact for decryption). Finally,
the total latency of an iteration is the latency of two epidemic
encrypted sums, one epidemic dissemination, and one epidemic
decryption. Given the practical settings discussed above (i.e.,
one million participants, an approximation error in the sum of
±0.001, and a threshold size of 0.01%), the total latency of an
11With ne=100 gossip exchanges and a maximal approximation
error emax = 10−9 (the other parameters reamining the
same as above) and according to Theorem 3 (from [25] - see
Appendix B), δ=(1−2·10−51)480, which is very close to 1.
iteration is on the order of a few hundreds of messages, domi-
nated by the epidemic encrypted sums. Injecting the local costs
observed above (NUMED dataset, G_SMA strategy) results in
a first iteration completing after around 26 mins and a fifth one
after around 10 mins (the effect of the noise made aberrant 60%
of the initial number of centroids between the first and the fifth
iteration). These times fit the context targeted by Chiaroscuro,
where the users are the individuals and the results do not suffer
from severe time constraints (e.g., background analysis).
6.4 Impact of Churn on Quality
The churn-enabled experiments (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)) show
a low sensitivity to churn. First, the churn-enabled intra-cluster
inertia follow closely those without churn. Indeed, the exclusion
of a random fraction of the highly redundant CER time-series
at each iteration does not incur strong skews. The increasing
divergence of the last iterations suggests that the reduction of
the cardinalities of clusters is of higher importance : the higher
the churn, the smaller the clusters and consequently the less
robust to a high-magnitude noise. Second, the relative error
of the encrypted epidemic sum due to the churn (Figure 3(b))
represents a negligible fraction of the exact sum for the three
levels of churn (at most a bit less than 0.1% for the highest
disconnection rate of 50% at each gossip exchange).
7. RELATED WORK
Generic secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques
[15, 37] are able to produce a distributed and secure version
of any centralized polynomial-time algorithm. However these
techniques cannot be used in practice for non-trivial algorithms
and non-tiny input data because of the prohibitive cost of the
distributed versions produced.
Specific SMC algorithms address the problem of clustering
horizontally partitioned datasets [5, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 27, 35].
Most of them consider only two participants, choose k-means or
a similar algorithm for performing the clustering, and all tackle
the honest-but-curious attack model. In [22], the algorithm is
made of a local phase computing the local means, and a global
phase averaging the two local sets of means. The computation
of the means taking place at each iteration is protected through
an homomorphic encryption scheme. However, the means are
disclosed at the end of each iteration, a breach that can lead
to uncontrolled data leaks. The authors of [20] distribute the
k-means algorithm by splitting each centroid in two comple-
mentary random parts, one per participant. A sequence of
SMC algorithms implements the usual k-means steps, guaran-
teeing a strong security level. However, the use of generic SMC
techniques raises strong concerns about fault-tolerance and scal-
ability. The solution proposed in [5] is also based on random
parts and SMC algorithms, but it avoids generic SMC techniques
through a smart use of homomorphic encryption and of a secure
scalar product algorithm [13]. However, the achievements of
scalability and fault-tolerance are still uncertain (transfer of the
full database of a participant, encrypted, to the other participant,
and use of random parts and SMC algorithms). The authors of
[19] (which extends [17] and [18]) use similar SMC algorithms
as well as random parts, and inherit from their drawbacks. The
authors of [35] consider many more participants but (1) orga-
nize them in a rigid tree-like structure and use random parts
and generic SMC techniques, which questions fault-tolerance
and scalability, and (2) disclose the raw means, which raises
security concerns. Other work has considered the adaptation of
other clustering algorithms (e.g., EM in [26], DBSCAN in [27]).
However, they use similar building blocks (random parts and
SMC algorithms) and thus suffer from similar drawbacks.
Finally, the problem of computing differentially-private ag-
gregates in a distributed manner has attracted attention in the
last decade (e.g., [1, 6, 33, 36]). This line of work usually (1)
assumes the presence of at least one central entity, notably for
driving the execution of (2) simple aggregate queries over (3)
thousands of participants. On the contrary, our work (1) con-
siders a full iterative k-means execution sequence (both specific
and complex) and (2) fully distributes it (high parallelism, no
central bottleneck, no unnecessary additional security/resource
assumption) over (3) millions of participants.
8. CONCLUSION
We proposed Chiaroscuro, the first solution to address the
problem of clustering massively distributed personal data with
sound privacy guarantees. Our original Diptych data structure
allows adapting k-means to a computing environment made
of autonomous personal computing devices. Our gossip-based
modus operandi provides scalability and fault-tolerance, while a
novel combination of homomorphic encryption with differential
privacy shields it against colluding dishonest nodes. We showed
through an extensive experimental validation that Chiaroscuro
achieves a quality comparable to centralized k-means executions
at an affordable cost. Exciting research perspectives include
characterizing the algorithms that Chiaroscuro can support.
The class of iterative analytical algorithms (e.g., expectation-
maximization or probabilistic matrix factorization) especially
fits the foundations laid down by Chiaroscuro.
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B. SECURITY
B.1 Differential Privacy of the Perturbation
Mechanism
The encrypted sum and count vectors of the means must be
perturbed by vectors of random variables that are sampled in
the appropriate Laplace distribution in order to satisfy differ-
ential privacy. In Chiaroscuro, the Laplace noises are computed
based on the EESum algorithm and the infinite divisibility of the
Laplace distribution (Lemma 1): the EESum algorithm simply
performs the homomorphically-encrypted sum of noise-shares
(Definition 5) generated locally by each participant. Such gossip-
based noise computation differs from a standard centralized
noise generation algorithm in two ways. First, gossip aggrega-
tion algorithms are approximate in nature; the resulting noise
thus contains an approximation error. Second, due to the mas-
sive distribution of gossip algorithms, the number of noise-shares
involved in the noise computation may be hard to know and
to fix beforehand. This may result in an additional error in the
noise generated. We show below that probabilistic differential
privacy is satisfied.
B.1.1 Approximate Sum
Although gossip aggregation algorithms are inherently approx-
imate, their approximation errors can be made arbitrarily small
in practice. Indeed, the gossip approximation error depends
essentially on the number of gossip exchanges per participant.
First, it is guaranteed to converge to zero exponentially fast
[21, 23] (see Theorem 3 below). Second, since the number of
exchanges per participant is a parameter, it can be set so that
the approximation error is as small as desired - i.e., typically
several orders of magnitude lower than the exact aggregate
value. We show below how the approximation error due to the
EESum algorithm is taken into account in the achievement of the
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy model. First, Lemma 2
shows how to compensate the approximation error. Then, The-
orem 3 (from [25]) shows how to compute the minimum number
of gossip exchanges per participant required for reaching the
desired (ǫ, δ) privacy level.
Lemma 2. Let S denote the gossip approximate sum of val-
ues, i.e., S = (1+ eS) ·
∑
i
xi where xi ∈ [dmin,dmax] and eS
denote the relative gossip approximation error. The approxi-
mation error is such that 0< |eS| ≤ emax with probability at
least 1 − ι [23]. Let λ = (1 + emax) ·max(|dmin|, |dmax|)/ǫ.
Let N denote the gossip approximate sum of noise-shares, i.e.,
N =(1+eN)·
∑nν
i
νi=(1+eN)·L(λ) where nν is the number
of noise-shares, each νi is a noise-share (Definition 5), and eN
denote the relative gossip approximation error. Similarly to eS,
eN is such that 0< |eN | ≤ emax with probability at least 1−ι.
Then, S′=S+N satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy,
where N=(1+emax/(1−emax))·N and δ=(1−ι)2.
Proof. The sensitivity of S is equal to : (1 + emax) ·
max(|dmin|, |dmax|) with probability at least 1− ι. Adding
to S a perturbation sampled in L(λ), where λ= (1+emax) ·
max(|dmin|,|dmax|)/ǫ, would thus satisfy ǫ-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy with probability at least 1−ι by definition. However,
the gossip sum of noise-shares does not yield the exact pertur-
bation because of its approximation error : N=(1+eN)·L(λ)
where 0< |eN |≤emax with probability at least 1−ι. Since eN
may be negative, the magnitude of the perturbation may be
reduced, which may question the privacy guarantees. The max-
imum loss occurs when eN is minimum, i.e., when eN=−emax.
It can be compensated by slightly increasing the perturbation.
Let c denote the relative compensation. The objective is to
have (1 + c) ·N ≥ L(λ), so (1 + c) · (1 + eN) · L(λ) ≥ L(λ).
At worst, eN =−emax, so we have (1+ c) · (1+ eN) · L(λ)≥
(1+c)·(1−emax)·L(λ). As a result, after the straightforward
development of (1+c)·(1−emax)·L(λ)≥L(λ), we must have
c≥ emax/(1−emax). So the approximation error of the gos-
sip sum of noise-shares can be compensated by increasing the
perturbation by a factor equal to c=emax/(1−emax). Conse-
quently, S′=S+(1+emax/(1−emax))·(1+eN)·L(λ) satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, where λ= (1+emax) ·
max(|dmin|,|dmax|)/ǫ and δ=(1−ι)2.
Next, we show how to compute the minimum number of gos-
sip exchanges required. The exact convergence speed depends
on the underlying network topology. The current version of
Chiaroscuro relies on Newscast [25] for managing the connectiv-
ity between participants. The convergence speed of aggregate
computation in Newscast is given by Theorem 3 [25], which
allows to compute the minimum number of gossip exchanges
required for reaching the desired approximation error with the
desired probability. If Chiaroscuro changes its connectivity layer,
the same computation would apply based on a different formula.
For simplicity, Theorem 3 considers a synchronous setting where
each participant performs a gossip exchange one after the other.
Theorem 3 (From [25]). With probability 1−ι, after ne=
⌈0.581(lognp+2logs+2log 1emax +log 1ι )⌉ exchanges per partic-
ipant, we have maxi|σi−σ|≤emax, where σi is the estimate of
the sum component of individual i’s local state and σ is its exact
global value, np is the cardinality of the population, emax>0 is
an upper bound on the approximation error, and s2 is the data
variance.
As a result, given the targeted privacy parameter δ and the
maximum number of iterations nmaxit , the differential privacy
probability assigned to each perturbed value is computed :
δatom=
(nmax
it
∗2n)
√
δ. Then, given δatom, the maximal error emax,
and the expected data variance s2 (if unknown, it can be set to,
e.g., an estimated upper bound), the minimum required number
of gossip exchanges ne per execution of the EESum algorithm
is computed (Theorem 3). For example, with δ=0.995, emax=
10−12, s2=1, and values from Section 6 (i.e., nmaxit =10, np=
106, and n=24), we have δatom= 480
√
0.995≈1−10−5. Then,
according to Theorem 3, ne=47 exchanges. This formula can be
adapted to a churn-enabled context by modeling the churn and
taking into account the evolving Newscast network topology.
B.1.2 Approximate Number of Noise-Shares
The noise-share generation algorithm is parameterized by nν,
the expected total number of noise-shares that will be summed
up. Ideally, this parameter shall be set to the number of partic-
ipants involved in the sum. When the latter is predictable (e.g.,
when there is no churn), nν can be set to the exact number
of noise-shares that will be actually summed up. Otherwise,
nν is not exact. In order to guarantee differential privacy, nν
is set to the expected maximal lower bound on the number of
noise-shares to be actually summed up. The actual sum thus
involves more noise-shares than necessary. We show below that
this surplus does not threaten the differential privacy guarantees.
Lemma 3. Let S denote the gossip approximate sum of val-
ues and N˜ denote the gossip approximate sum of noise-shares.
N˜ results from summing up more noise-shares than necessary,
i.e., N˜ = (1+ emax/(1− emax)) · (1+ eN) · (
∑nν
i
νi+
∑n+ν
i
νi)
where nν is the lower bound of noise-shares and n
+
ν is the num-
ber of additional noise-shares. Then, S′ = S+N˜ satisfies (ǫ,
δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, where δ=(1−ι)2.
Proof. We have N˜ = (1 + emax/(1 − emax)) · (1 + eN) ·
(
∑nν
i
νi+
∑n+ν
i
νi). Let a denote the noise-independent fac-
tors due to the gossip approximation, i.e., a=(1+emax/(1−
emax)) ·(1+eN). Then N˜ = a ·(
∑nν
i
νi+
∑n+ν
i
νi), and conse-
quently N˜ =a ·L(λ)+a ·∑n+ν
i
νi. By adding N˜ to S we have
S′=S+N˜ =S+N+a ·∑n+ν
i
νi. Since (1) S+N satisfies (ǫ,
δ)-probabilistic differential privacy where δ=(1−ι)2 (Lemma 2),
and (2) a·∑n+ν
i
νi is independent from S andN, then S′=S+N˜
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy too.
Additionally, participants can correct the sum of noise-shares
N˜ by subtracting a quantity equivalent in expectation to the
non-necessary noise-shares included in the sum. Similarly to
the additional noise-shares summed up in N˜, the correction
is independent from S and N. Thus, its subtraction does not
threaten differential privacy.
B.2 Security Against Inferences
We assess formally the security of Chiaroscuro against infer-
ences according to the usual secure multi-party computation
(SMC) methodology [14]. Informally speaking, it consists in
comparing the information about the input dataset that leaks
from the distributed algorithm instantiated on the distributed
architecture (real setting), to the information that leaks from
a centralized version of the algorithm run by an ideally trusted
third party (ideal setting). If the difference between the two is
negligible, then the distributed algorithm is said to be secure.
The comparison is usually done based on the notion of compu-
tational indistinguishability [14], which states roughly that two
distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
(denoted by
c≡) if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is
able to draw a significant difference between them.
We first formalize the security model of Chiaroscuro against
inferences from honest-but-curious participants, which was infor-
mally stated in Section 2.3. Based on this model, we then give
the full-length proof of security against inferences of Theorem 2
(stated in Section 4.3).
In the real setting, the adversary is (within) a participant.
We follow the standard practical assumption that the adver-
sary is computationally-bounded and model it as a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm. The real-setting adversary has thus
access to the participant’s local data and parameters, to local
transient information used or generated during the execution,
and to the output of the algorithm. He exploits all this in
any computationally-feasible way in order to gain additional
knowledge about the other input time-series. In the ideal setting,
the adversary has only access to the output of the centralized
k-means algorithm perturbed by a differentially-private mech-
anism.
Loosely speaking, our security model (Definition 7) states
that Chiaroscuro securely computes k-means if the side-effect
information disclosed during the execution of an instance of
Chiaroscuro (1) is perturbed by a differentially-private mech-
anism, (2) is independent from the input time-series and with
the noise, or (3) does not increase significantly the adversarial
knowledge (as defined by computational indistinguishability).
Definition 7. Let π be an instance of Chiaroscuro executed
on a set of participants and ∆ be the union of (1) the set of
all perturbed means (either disclosed during π or output by the
ideal-setting k-means) and (2) the set of all the information
independent from the input time-series and noise. Given an
input set of time-series S, an attacker A, and an arbitrary back-
ground knowledge χ ∈ {0,1}∗, we denote REALπ,A(χ,∆)(S) the
distribution representing the adversarial knowledge over the in-
put dataset in the real setting - with a full knowledge of ∆, and
IDEALkMeans,A(χ,∆)(S) the distribution representing the adver-
sarial knowledge in the ideal setting - with a full knowledge of
∆ too. We say that π securely computes k-means iff for every
adversary Ar attacking π, there exists an adversary Ai for the
ideal model so that for every χ∈{0,1}∗:
{REALπ,Ar(χ,∆)(S)}S
c≡{IDEALkMeans,Ai(χ,∆)(S)}S
Proof. The security of π against honest-but-curious partic-
ipants can be shown through a thorough and exhaustive exam-
ination of the data structures that are communicated among
participants along the execution sequence in the real setting.
We focus on the computation step because the assignment step
and the convergence step at each iteration are performed locally,
by each participant, without any data transfer.
1. Epidemic computation of the encrypted means: the se-
mantically-secure encryptions M.s and M.c, and the data-
independent M.ω and n;
2. Epidemic noise generation: idem, and the data-independent
ctr and cor;
3. Epidemic decryption: the partially encrypted M.s and M.c,
the perturbedM, and the data-independent idk;
We can easily observe that (1) any information depending on the
personal time-series is communicated either after having been
encrypted by a semantically-secure encryption scheme (step 1)
or after having been perturbed by a differentially-private mech-
anism (step 3), and (2) idem for the information depending
on the value of the noise generated (step 2). The remaining
data structures depend neither on the time-series nor on the
noise. In other words, by denoting by E the set of information
encrypted by a semantically-secure encryption scheme (which
output is computationally-indistinguishable from the output of
a pseudo-random bitstring generator) : E={M.s,M.c} and {M.ω,
n, ctr, cor, idk,M}∈∆.
As a result :
{REALπ,Ar(χ,∆)(S)}S
c≡{IDEALkMeans,Ai(χ,∆,E)(S)}S
Moreover, since the ideal-setting adversary can simulate E
through a pseudo-random bistring generator, then :
{IDEALkMeans,Ai(χ,∆,E)(S)}S
c≡{IDEALkMeans,Ai(χ,∆)(S)}S
Consequently :
{REALπ,Ar(χ,∆)(S)}S
c≡{IDEALkMeans,Ai(χ,∆)(S)}S
B.3 Collusions
The degree of resistance to collusions is defined by the number
of key-shares and noise-shares used. Compromising a participant
results essentially in disclosing its key-share and its noise-share.
First, the disclosure of a key-share leaks nothing about the secret
polynom in Ξ if the attacker has not τ −1 other key-shares.
Second, the disclosure of a noise-share leaks the smallest pos-
sible fraction of noise (the number of noise-shares is maximal
because noise-shares are distributed on the complete population).
For example, with one million participants, and a participant
colluding with c− 1 others, there remains 106 − c unknown
other noise-shares used for generating the noise. As a result,
the fraction of the secret noise in Ξ unknown to a colluding
participant p decreases linearly with the number of collusions
from p (bounded by the given threshold τ).
C. CORRECTNESS
Chiaroscuro follows an iterative execution sequence. Each
iteration has three steps : the assignment step, the computation
step, and the convergence step. We start by showing the cor-
rectness of both the assignment step and the convergence step.
Then we concentrate on the correctness of the computation step.
C.1 Assignment Step, Convergence Step, and
Termination
During the assignment step, each participant computes the dis-
tance between its time-series and each of the centroids output by
the previous iteration (they appear in the clear, their privacy be-
ing guaranteed by differential privacy) to identify the closest cen-
troid. During the convergence step, each participant computes
the distance between the new set of centroids (resulting from the
previous computation step) and the old ones (output by the pre-
vious iteration) and compares it to the given convergence thresh-
old. These two steps (1) involve local computations only (2)
based on cleartext data. They are consequently trivially correct.
The k-means iterations stop either when centroids have con-
verged or when a fixed number of iterations has been reached.
This disjunctive termination criterion is easy to check locally
and guarantees that the k-means algorithm terminates.
C.2 Computation Step
C.2.1 Epidemic Computation of the Encrypted Means
First, the encrypted sum and count vectors of the means (i.e.,
M.s andM.c) are computed by the EESum algorithm, our gossip-
based algorithm dedicated to computing homomorphically-
encrypted sums. While the local update rule of the standard
non-encrypted gossip-based sum algorithm [23] performs a divi-
sion by two at each exchange, the local update rule of the EESum
algorithm (Algorithm 2) simply delays it to the end of the algo-
rithm (homomorphic encryptions do not support divisions). It is
easy to see that both update rules are arithmetically equivalent.
Proof. With the standard non-encrypted local update rule,
a given variable will have been divided by 2i after its ith average.
This is the same with our homomorphically-encrypted update
rule. Indeed, we keep track (1) of the encrypted sum of variables
and (2) of the divisor. First, by definition, the divisor is always
equal to 2nl , where nl is the current number of exchanges. Sec-
ond, all variables having been averaged less than nl times, say i
times, are multiplied by 2nl−i during the exchange (i.e., the scal-
ing operation in the update rule). As a result, their actual divisor
at exchange nl is equal to 2nl/2nl−i=2i where i is the current
number of times they have been averaged. This is arithmetically
equivalent to performing directly the average on values. The
local update rule of the EESum algorithm is thus correct.
The EESum algorithm terminates after a maximum number
of exchanges fixed beforehand to a value sufficient for the sum
to converge. Since the actual number of exchanges performed
by each participant increases monotonically, the termination
criterion is guaranteed to be satisfied eventually. Since it can
be trivially enforced locally by each participant, the EESum al-
gorithm is thus guaranteed to terminate.
C.2.2 Epidemic Noise Generation
The epidemic noise generation step computes the sum of noise-
shares based on the EESum algorithm and corrects it if necessary
by disseminating the correction vector associated to the lowest
identifier. The EESum algorithm has been shown above to be
correct; we focus on the correctness of the dissemination algo-
rithm. First, each participant having contributed to the sum of
noise-shares independently computes a correction proposal and
assigns it a random identifier. Next, participants disseminate
it based on standard epidemic dissemination algorithms, keep-
ing at each exchange the correction proposal with the lowest
identifier. Because the set of corrections (and identifiers) is
fixed (only the participants involved in the sum can propose a
correction vector), the standard diffusion speed results of epi-
demic dissemination algorithms apply [23]. Similarly to gossip
aggregation algorithms, the probability that the disseminated
correction vector does not reach a part of the population (1)
depends on the number of gossip exchanges and (2) converges to
zero exponentially fast (e.g., in our experiments, a value was dis-
seminated to one million participants with less than 50 messages
per participant). We consider it as negligible in practice.
C.2.3 Epidemic Decryption
Finally, the correctness of the epidemic decryption is easy to
state. First, a given key-share is applied at most once to a given
encrypted value. Indeed, each participant keeps the identifiers of
the key-shares having been applied to his local encrypted value.
Second, at most nκ key-shares are applied to each encrypted
value. By counting the number of key-shares identifiers kept
locally, any participant knows when nκ is reached. Finally, the
local sets of key-shares grow monotonically, guaranteeing the
termination of the epidemic decryption. Indeed, by definition,
no key-share is removed from a local set.
D. ILLUSTRATION ON 2D POINTS
In order to further illustrate the results of Chiaroscuro, we
have used a 750K two-dimensional points dataset. These points
are distributed into a set of 50 clusters12. We have executed both
the standard k-means algorithm and Chiaroscuro (GREEDY
strategy) over it with the parameters used in the evaluation
section (Section 6). Our version of this dataset was generated
by duplicating 100 times each of the 7.5K points contained in
the A3 dataset and adding to each copy a uniform random value
small enough to preserve the clusters. Two-dimensional points
differ from time-series in the absence of temporal relationship
between dimensions (though they are similar to time-series of
size 2 for the privacy part). Therefore, the quality-enhancing
smoothing techniques presented in Section 5.2 cannot apply.
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) represent the set of two-dimensional
points (i.e., small green points) (1) with the centroids obtained
by the non-private standard k-means algorithm for the former
figure, and (2) with the centroids obtained by the perturbed
k-means algorithm (GREEDY strategy) for the latter figure.
Both centroids were produced at the iteration #6, i.e., the
highest-quality iteration for the perturbed k-means. Although
the perturbed centroids are less accurate, they appear mostly
within an actual cluster, close to it, or between several clusters,
which is similar to the usual behaviour of the non-perturbed
version of k-means.
12I. Kärkkäinen and P. Fränti, “Dynamic local search algorithm
for the clustering problem”, Research Report A-2002-6, available
at https://cs.joensuu.fi/sipu/datasets/
(a) In the Clear (b) Chiaroscuro (GREEDY, no smoothing)
Figure 6: Centroids Resulting from k-means Executions over the 750K Two-Dimensional Points (6th iteration)
